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Introduction 
One of the facts that identifies law as a profession is the phe-
nomenon of the first year of law school. For the lay public, it 
must appear remarkable that law students-being trained to oper-
ate in worlds that are changing with increasing rapidity-should 
nevertheless spend their first year analyzing many of the same 
judicial decisions studied during their predecessors' first year. 
It is because certain opinions attain a precedential value beyond 
the facts of the specific disputes they resolve that their study is not 
inconsistent with the learning of contemporary doctrine. Public 
acceptance of the profession, however, rests precisely on the ability 
to blur this distinction between the operational and precedential 
function of a judicial opinion: to explicate, for the lay public, the 
mysteries of precedent as though what was involved was a logically 
coherent series of clearly stated propositions embodied in the opin-
ions in terms of which specific human controversies were resolved. 
One of the authors recently analyzed a contemporary opinion, 
Fogel v. Chestnutt, 1 as a demonstration of the fact that the differ-
ence between tl':\_e work of a professional expert and a technician 
(the difference, fbr example, between things called judicial opinions 
as opposed to administrative rulings) is ultimately a matter of 
style. 2 The profession, however, has interpreted that opinion as 
based on the fact that "the outside directors had not had the op-
portunity to make an informed business judgment" because "the 
management directors (who arguably had an interest in not pursu-
• Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
"'* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University Law School. 
I 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975). 
2 Deutsch, "Fogel v. Chestnutt: The Meaning of an Opinion," 4 Sec. Reg. 
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ing recapture) had failed to make the independent directors ad-
equately aware of the possible techniques for recapture and to 
point out the advantages and disadvantages of adopting them." 3 
Since the public function of the judicial opinion is to provide "the 
link between rationale and result that distinguishes law from fiat," 4 
and since the value of the legal profession to the lay public is a 
function of the extent to which lawyers are perceived as possessed 
of a unique skill (the reading of judicial opinions), acceptance of 
this interpretation may well entail serious consequences in connec-
tion with the status and role of the profession-and thus the nature 
of law-in the contemporary world. 
Moreover, even if the law is a matter of style, the crucial style 
for this nation is that of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
and we cannot understand the style of the Burger Court unless we 
understand the style of the Warren Court, how the two styles differ, 
and why. 
The essential quality of the Warren Court approach to constitu-
tional adjudication was to seek the right result. Faced with limita-
tions on its time, that Court, as it moved away from the role of 
ruling that something was constitutional or not, and toward con-
cern with affirmative results, began to establish rules, that is, pos-
itive assertions as to what would be constitutional. 5 
The limitations on this approach are a consequence of the limita-
tions inherent in the rule-making technique. The fundamental 
defect of proceeding by rules is that one selects a few features of 
an event and prescribes a result that is to follow if those features 
are present. A result reached under a rule will remain what is 
intended only if all the other facts turn out not to be relevant. If, 
however, the facts not specified in the rule turn out to be relevant 
and more important than the rule-specified facts, then the result 
reached under the rule will become unintended. 
This dilemma can be illustrated from the history of the Miranda 
rules, whkh produced a procedure within the control of the police. 
3 Leech & Mundheim, "The Outside Director of the Publicly Held Cor-
poration," 31 Bus. Law. 1799, 1805-1806 (1976). 
4 Deutsch, note 2 supra, at 375. 
ssee, e.g., Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963), especially at 
123 n.8, and App. at 124-129. 
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It proved to be no great challenge to comply with the rules and 
still obtain confessions. Worst of all for the accused, however, the 
jury trial on the basic issue of voluntariness had been lost. 
As a result, one of the effects of the Miranda rules was to shift 
significant power to the lower federal judiciary, since judges un-
sympathetic to the rules could comply with their literal formula-
tions while still sustaining confessions. In this sense, Miranda rep-
resents an implementation of formal rule-making power by the . 
Supreme Court of the United States, at the cost of losing the sub-
stantive power to correct individual failures of justice on the part 
of the subordinate judiciary. 
The Judicial Opinion as Political Document 
A reading of Fogel v. Chestnutt consonant with this view of 
Miranda as a decision whose effects are the product of relationships 
among different levels of the judiciary would view the Fogel opin-
ion as "a political document, whose focus is the activities of federal 
trial and appellate judges." 6 Such a reading is premised on a view 
of appellate tribunals as engaged in the process of delineating the 
ways in which trial courts should apply the law. It follows that the 
Burger Court, in implementing a shift in style from the Warren 
Court, must both obtain the attention of lower courts and convey 
the information that a change has taken place. 
One of the techniques for accomplishing this is, of course, to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the district courts. In Stone v. Powell/ 
the Supreme Court held that district courts could not entertain 
writs of federal habeas corpus from state prisoners on search and 
seizure issues. The Court stated that the constitutional values 
promoted by exclusion of the illegally seized evidence are suffi-
ciently promoted if state courts apply the exclusionary rules subject 
to the supervision of the Supreme Court's certiorari and appeals 
jurisdiction, and that the district courts, while adding nothing of 
value, would subtract something in terms of costs. A second tech-
nique for limiting lower court discretion to develop policy is found 
6 Deutsch, note 2 supra, at 381. 
r 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976) . 
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in such cases as Washington v. Davis8 and Buffalo Forge v. United 
Steel Workers/ which contain "laundry lists" of lower court opin-
ions that are disapproved. 1o 
In professional terms, however, it is Hicks v. Miranda11 that is 
the most striking variation on these techniques. In that case, the 
Supreme Court declared that lower courts are bound by summary 
decisions of the Supreme Court dismissing appeals from state courts 
for want of a substantial federal question. The unprecedented 
nature of that holding was demonstrated when the Fourth Circuit 
refused to consider a constitutional attack upon a massage parlor 
ordinance because the Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal 
from the Virginia Supreme Court for want of a substantial federal 
question. Mr. Justice Clark, who was sitting as a member of the 
panel by designation, stated that "the Supreme Court's statements 
in Hicks v. Miranda, ... to the effect that such dismissals are de-
cisions on the merits, seem to me to fly in the face of the long-
established practice of the Court at least during the eighteen Terms 
in which I sat." 12 It is a fact, however, that the Seventh Circuit13 
and the Third Circuit14 have acted in accordance with the Fourth 
Circuit's example. 
Such Supreme Court holdings, insofar as they succeed in pro-
ducing a shift in lower court decisional processes, will, of course, 
intensify the self-consciousness about the policies of the judicial 
process that characterized reactions to the activities of the Warren 
Court. The extent to which such self-consciousness concerning 
process exists in the lower appellate judiciary is perhaps most 
clearly demonstrated in the Second Circuit's denial of en bane 
rehearing in Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. , because "with four 
senior judges sitting ... the law of the circuit might well be charted 
a 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2050 n.12 (1976) . 
9 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3147-3 148 n.10 ( 1976). 
10 See also Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 
(1975). 
11 442 u.s. 332 (1975). 
12 Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F .2d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1975). 
13 Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 11 56 (7th Cir. 1976). 
14 Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 
1975). 
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with the concurrence of only a minority of the active judges," and 
because "[a] case in which Supreme Court resolution is inevitable 
should not be permitted to tarry . .. except when the views of this 
Court would be of real benefit to the Supreme Court." 15 
This self-consciousness has its roots in the work of Henry Hart 
I 
the scholar who taught a generation of lawyers and law students 
that the most fruitful way to analyze the law was as a process rather 
than by a focus on the substantive rules contained in the opinions . 
resolving particular controversies. Hart's vision is ultimately rooted 
in the fact that the political structure of our society is federal in 
nature, as evidenced in the penultimate exchange in "The Power of 
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise 
in Dialectic": 
"Q. But Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of state courts, 
too, in federal matters. 
"A. Congress can't do it constitutionally. The state courts al-
ways have a general jurisdiction to fall back on. And the Suprem-
acy Clause binds them to exercise that jurisdiction in accordance 
with the Constitution." 16 
Given this view that the ultimate constitutional safeguard is 
provided by state law as opposed to the provision of a federal 
forum, it was perhaps to be expected that the Second Circuit's 
certainty that its views on the question of whether: 
"Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 authorize federal courts, in the 
absence of any allegation of misrepresentation or non-disclosure, 
to condemn, as breach of corporate fiduciary duty, conduct that 
is expressly sanctioned by the state that created the corporation, 
and to impose on the use of the state short-form merger statute 
requirements it is conceded the law of the state does not op-
pose" 17 
"would [not] be of real benefit to the Supreme Court" 18 would 
result from the latter's decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
1s 533 F .2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976). 
16 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1001 (1953). 
17 Petition for Certiorari in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. G reen, No. 75-1753. 
18 Text at note 15 supra. 
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Drug Stores, which held that "[W]e are of the opinion that Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461 (C.A. 2, 1952) was 
rightly decided, and that it bars respondent from maintaining this 
suit under Rule 10b-5." T9 
Precisely what the meaning of that holding will be is, of course, 
a matter of prophecy, since, when Blue Chip was decided, the 
statt~s of the Birnbaum ruling, even in the Second Circuit, was that 
"although some courts have held that a private party not a pur-
chaser or seller, seeking injunctive relief, may have standing to 
assert a § 1 O(b) violation . . . and another has suggested the 
elimination of the purchaser-seller requirement .. . it is still the 
rule in this Circuit that the requirement be satisfied in a suit for 
damages." 20 
The basis for the Blue Chip holding, however, seems clearly to 
have been an attempt to bring to a halt a rule-making process that 
appeared relatively easy to arrest since it had been implemented 
largely by subordinate appellate tribunals. 
"We quite agree that if Congress had legislated the elements of 
a private cause of action for damages, the duty of the Judicial 
Bra~ch . ":ould be to administer the law which Congress enacted; 
the ]Udtctary may not circumscribe a right which Congress has 
conferred because of any disagreement it might have with Con-
gress about the wisdom of creating so expansive a liability. But 
as we have pointed out, we are not dealing here with any private 
right created by the express language of § 1 O(b) or of Rule 
lOb-5. No language in either of those provisions speaks at all 
to the contours of a private cause of action for their violation. 
~owever ~exi?ly we may construe the language of both provi-
swns, nothmg m such construction militates against the Birnbaum 
rule. We are dealing with a private cause of action which has 
b.een judi.ci~lly found to exist, and which will have to be judi-
ctally delimited one way or another unless and until Congress 
addr.es.ses t~e question. Given the peculiar blend of legislative, 
adrrumstrative, and judicial history which now surrounds Rule 
19 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1923 (1975). 
20 Ingenito v. Berma Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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lOb-5, we believe that practical factors to which we have ad-
verted, and to which other courts have referred, are entitled to 
a good deal of weight." 21 
The Definition of an Expert 
Social Meaning of Expertise 
The rationale that justified the expansion of federal jurisdiction 
resulting from the erosion of the Birnbaum precedent was the need 
to police the operations of those in control of corporations. Thus, 
because of such procedural advantages as nationwide service of 
process, federal securities legislation was perceived as a necessary 
adjunct to the shareholder's derivative suit developed by the com-
mon law to perform that function. The dangers inherent in an 
overly broad reading of the statutory provisions governing federal 
securities law was perhaps most succinctly put by Second Circuit 
Judge Medina in a dissent from an en bane reversal of the dismissal 
of a 10(b)5 complaint: 
"The essence of the claim is that, whenever a corporation through 
action of its directors sells a block of its own stock, a stockholder 
can maintain an action in the federal courts under Section 10 (b) 
and Rule 10(b)5 by merely alleging that the price was too low 
or too high, that the directors 'knew or should have known' it 
was too low or too high, sealed with the characterization or 
opinion of the claimant that this was a 'fraud' perpetrated against 
the corporation. This does indeed open the floodgates. For the 
result is to transform a simple cause of action against directors 
for waste or the use of bad judgment in the sale of corporate 
assets into a federal securities fraud case by judicial fiat." 22 
"What this amounts to is giving carte blanche to every holder of 
a few shares in any corporation whose stock is traded on the 
New York or American stock exchanges to give his imagination 
full rein in the making of any sort of extravagant charges, no 
21 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, note 19 supra, at 1931-1932. 
22 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 220, rev'g 405 F.2d 200, 
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matter how ill founded in fact they may be, and then, when 
faced with a summary judgment motion based upon personal 
knowledge and documentary proof, say simply 'I know nothing 
whatever about the matter but hope my lawyer will find some-
thing if we conduct extensive discovery proceedings and compel 
the defendants to produce their complete files.' This, while doubt-
less not so intended, is in my judgment nothing short of a stand-
ing invitation to blackmail and extortion." 23 
Even if one grants that the departure from Birnbaum was ex-
cessive in that the course of decision in the Second Circuit over-
estimated the benefits and underestimated the dangers involved in 
the expansion of federal jurisdiction, the question remains whether 
any retreat will strike the proper balance rather than representing 
simply a countervailing excess or an inadequate correction. To 
determine whether or not Fogel v. Chestnutt has struck such a 
balance, it is necessary to define the precedential significance of 
that decision, and it is our contention that the profession's inter-
pretation of that significance24 ignores the role necessarily played 
by expertise, not only generally but also in the particular business 
situation that was being subjected to judicial review in that case. 
Thus, despite the fact that "there were . . . business reasons 
against seeking recapture, at least for the period when reciprocals 
or give-ups to brokers in return for sales efforts were in vogue," 25 
the Fogel Court held, "in remanding to the district court for the 
determination of damages" 26 that "the considerations against al-
lowing defendants to attempt to prove that, after independent 
investigation by the disinterested directors, the board might rea-
sonably have concluded not to recapture . . . similarly foreclose 
defendants with respect to damages." 27 The imposition of this 
remedy of damages upon the defendants is thus justifiable only if 
the information at issue concerning recapture was material for the 
consideration of the entire board of directors rather than a matter 
23 Id. at 221. 
24 See text at note 3 supra. 
25 Fogel v. Chestnutt, note 15 supra, at 756. 
26 !d. at 755. 
27 Id. at 756. 
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of purely technical expertise properly entrusted to those members 
of the board regarded by that body as competent to deal with it. 
The basis on which this possibility of trusting a smaller group 
is suggested is the rationale for reliance upon any form of exper-
tise: the fact that the limited amount of time at the disposal of any 
given human heing renders both necessary and efficient the special-
ization made possible by a division of labor. Division of labor, 
however, is often far more efficient than necessary, and the latter 
quality increasingly comes into play to the extent that the activity 
in question cannot accurately be reduced to a set of techniques, a 
regular pattern, or formula. In any given conflict, for example 
(whether political, ec0nomic, or military), such concep!s as mo-
mentum, morale, or strategic advantage are applicable to the war 
as a whole rather than to an individual battle, precisely because, 
if enough factors are taken into account, single occurrences can be 
analyzed so completely as to empty concepts such as morale of 
content. The fact remains, however, that few wars consist of one 
battle alone, and that any subsequent battles are fought in the 
context of all that has gone before, thus rendering the prior analysis 
of a set of instances necessarily incomplete. Given the premium 
placed on novelty by the inadequacy of historical analysis in en-
suring future success, perhaps the critical test applied by history 
in determining whether the designation of expert has been earned 
is the value of the changes introduced into the field of expertise by 
the person claiming the designation, and the durability of those 
changes. 
The value of expertise is that it provides a basis on which to 
judge the validity of competing claims within its area, and the 
danger constantly confronting the expert is the temptation to claim 
expertise for judgments concerning situations that involve crucial 
factors located outside that area. What makes innovations so crit-
ical a test, then, is that they represent attempts to expand the scope 
of expertise by persuading the public that such new situations can 
be encompassed. The recent history of the United States Presidency 
provides concrete examples of these general propositions, if the 
question addressed is the implementation of political expertise. 
In particular, what an exploration of the recent history of the 
presidential form of political expertise demonstrates are two closely 
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related characteristics of expertise: F irst, the extent to which main-
tenance of any system affecting a lay public not only requires the 
implementation of expertise, but also constrains the expert; and 
second, the fact that the expert controls innovation more success-
fully than a technician confined to implementing a given set of 
techniques in a logically coherent manner, because of the expert's 
demonstrated awareness that symbols incapable of complete anal-
ysis are crucially important in permitting the lay public to partici-
pate in the exercise of expertise. Thus, in contrast to President 
Eisenhower, whose expertise-developed as the commander of a 
multinational armed force-consisted of successful orchestration 
of the work of a variety of experts autonomous within individual 
substantive fields, President Kennedy attempted to limit that auton-
omy not only by setting up parallel institutions within the White 
House, but also by seeking substantive information from junior 
officers in the various administrative hierarchies. The Nixon Pres-
idency illustrates the extent to which such an attempt to expand 
the scope of a given form of expertise may result in destruction of 
the system in terms of which that expertise is exercised. Perhaps 
even more important, however, is the extent to which such attempts 
may well change the relationship between any such system and the 
consumers of its products: "Ask not what your country can do for 
you; ask what you can do for your country." 
That this analysis may be applicable to mutual funds can be 
illustrated by analogy with insurance. Because of the relatively 
stringent limits on substantive differences among policies imposed 
by regulatory authorities, the art of selling a given policy consists 
largely of convincing prospects that they should prefer one sort of 
program over another, despite the fact that variations in such things 
as access to capital and required cash payments are, at least in the 
long run, to a significant extent mathematical equivalents. Sim-
ilarly, in the case of mutual funds, the competition for customers 
must largely take the form of demonstrating to prospects that the 
particular configuration of capital appreciation, risk, and cash 
payments historically characteristic of a given fund's performance 
fulfills the needs created by their particular lifestyle more closely 
than any competing fund. 
Assuming the correctness of this analysis of the basis on whkh 
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mutual funds are substituted for individual investment programs, 
it is presumably the task of the "disinterested" directors, as repre-
sentatives of the holders of fund shares, to ensure that the particular 
configuration of elements on the basis of which the fund was sold 
continues to be maintained. On that assumption, furthermore, the 
question presented to the Court in Fogel v. Chestnutt can be re-
stated as whether the issue of "recapture" relates to the task of 
defining the proper configuration of the fund or solely to that body 
of expertise properly regarded as technical, in that it is concern~d 
solely with the techniques to be utilized in achieving that configura-
tion. It is because of this fact, finally, that that decision surfaces 
for examination the distinction between technician and. expert in 
terms of the responsibilities necessarily assumed by each in terms 
of their relationship to the lay public. 
Remedies 
If the above analysis of the social meaning of expertise has been 
convincing, the test of judicial expertise would occur in the field 
known as remedies, since the way in which a judgment is executed 
defines the extent to which the conclusion arrived at in the judicial 
decision is attempted to be implemented. In addition, if the above 
analysis constitutes an accurate description, what is happening to 
law would represent a reaction to the results of prior judicial 
innovations. 
In connection with the question of the significance to be attrib-
uted to the avail ability of information under federal securities leg-
islation, it seems noteworthy that on the basis of the historical fact 
that "the derivation of Rule 1 Ob-5 is peculiar," 28 the author of 
Fogel v. Chestnutt (in an earlier circuit court decision) concluded 
that "the consequences of holding that negligence in the drafting 
of a press release ... may impose civil liability on the corporation 
are frightening," 29 even though he had joined the majority in the 
earlier opinion in holding insider trading activity "the <?n1Y truly 
objective evidence of the materiality of [a mineral] discovery" and 
28 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) · 
29 !d. at 866. 
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thus disapproving the action of the district court, which had "dis-
regarded" that evidence "in favor of the defendants' expert wit-
nesses, all of whom agreed that one drill core does not established 
an ore body, much less a mine." 30 
In more general terms, the remedies in terms of which judicial 
expertise is most seriously at issue today are those involved in 
school desegregation decrees. Perhaps the most explicit judicial 
recognition of the factors that resulted in this situation occurred in 
Hobson v. Hansen, in which Judge Skelly Wright noted that 
"It is regrettable, of course, that in deciding this case this court 
must act in an area so alien to its expertise. It would be far 
better indeed for these great social and political problems to be 
resolved in the political area by other branches of government. 
But these are social and political problems which seem at times 
to defy such resolution. In such situations, under our system, 
the judiciary must bear a hand and accept its responsibility to 
assist in the solution where constitutional rights hang in the 
balance." 31 
The purpose of the Hobson litigation was to ensure for the poor 
and black a right to equal educational opportunity with the white 
middle class. To achieve that result-and it is important to stress 
that that result has not in fact been achieved-Judge Wright or-
dered a massive intervention into the administrative operations of 
the District of Columbia school system to ensure equalization of 
expenditures, which, in a later opinion,32 was defined as requiring 
that per-pupil expenditures on the salaries and benefits of teachers 
in any elementary school should not differ more than 5 percent 
from the mean expenditure in all such schools. That history ap-
pears to have demonstrated the impossibility-or perhaps the ir-
relevance-of implementing so rigid a formula, seems to us less 
significant than that history may also provide a satisfactory answer 
to the query as to why the attempt was undertaken. 
Acts 3 and 5 of the Second Extraordinary Session of 1961 rep-
30 !d. at 851. 
31 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967). 
32 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971). 
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resented responses by the Louisiana Legislature to Bush v. Orleans 
Parish School Board, 33 in which a three-judge court (on which 
Judge Wright sat) successfully issued restraining orders and in-
junctions running directly against the Legislature. These acts, 
passed as a result of the attempt on the part of the School Board 
of Orleans Parish to comply with a court order to desegregate, 
created two new crimes: the giving to or acceptance by any parent 
of anything of apparent value as an inducement to sending a child 
to a school operated in violation of Louisiana law; and the doing· 
of any act to a parent or child to influence that person to do any 
act in violation of that law. 
The Louisiana Attorney General's defense of the Acts consisted 
of the arguments that the Acts were so vague that the state courts 
would hold them illegal, and that they were irrelevant to the sub-
ject matter of the Bush litigation on the ground that the phrase "in 
violation of any law of this state" could not refer to desegregated 
schools because all of the state laws that required school desegre-
gation had been held unconstitutional by the federal courts. What 
the Bush court relied on in justifying the use of federal judicial 
power to void state legislative acts in the field of criminal law was 
the historical fact that all contemporary Louisiana legislation de-
signed to prevent desegration had used that phrase and that the 
context of those statutes had made it clear that the phrase "in 
violation of" meant desegregated schools.34 What the Hobson 
court overlooked was the historical fact that the meanings of con-
texts change, and that history itself is one of the forces producing 
such transformations. 
33 194 F. Supp. 182 (B.D. La. 1961). 
34 Id. at 182-187. 
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